Abstract. In this paper I examine the value of theories of social practice for cultural geography. I consider the relationship between culture and language use by drawing on the later philosophy of Wittgenstein, whose work explores the concepts of shared understanding and rule-following. Wittgenstein's approach assists in avoiding the type of misconceptions apparent in represcntationalist criticisms of influential theories of practice like those of Giddcns and Bourdieu. A more fruitful way of dealing with practices is also suggested, which connects rules to the use of language and thereby to geographically specific cultures. Although several problems are identified in employing a Wittgensteinian analysis of practice, its applicability to human geography is considered in relation to the subjects of embodiment and place, as well as to the delineation of cultures and to issues of epistcmology.
Introduction
Cultural geography has conceived of the object of its study-culture-in many ways. Definitions typically derive from anthropology, and concentrate on culture as a way of life, being a shared set of beliefs and values, distinctive symbolic formations, and social practices (sec also Jackson, 1989, page 2; McDowell, 1994, page 148) . Behaviour is given form and purpose by certain shared understandings of the world, and particular practices are accepted as normal. The description of culture as a way of life therefore requires a conception that is wider than the purely intellectual realm of ideas and opinions. In recent debates, a turn towards practices has been seen to offer a path between the reification of culture as superorganic and the relativism of treating individuals as free to draw upon a repertoire of norms and systems of thought (Duncan, 1980; Mitchell, 1995; Shurmer-Smith and Hannam, 1994, page 79) .
A concern with language is intrinsic to theories of practice in two ways. Ontologically, language is held to be a means by which understandings can be shared, the boundaries of a culture can be defined, and practices can be reproduced. Epistemologically, it is through the representation of thought in language that the meanings of members of a culture can be grasped. In geography, this is most evident in interrogations of landscape as a kind of text or symbols to be read (such as Barnes and Duncan, 1992; Duncan and Duncan, 1988; Duncan and Ley, 1993) . In this paper I argue for a different approach to the relationship between language and practice by drawing on the later philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein viewed language as an instrument or a tool to be manipulated purposively, as part of everyday engagements with the social world (Wittgenstein, 1953, §23) . He suggested that meaning of words could very often be discerned by a close inspection of their use, through taking into account the situation as a whole rather than by trying to break down a sentence into its component parts (Wittgenstein, 1953, §43) , and, in the course of describing the embeddedness and directed nature of what he called 'language-games', Wittgenstein's ideas chime with current thinking about nonrepresentationalism (Thrift, 1997, pages 126-132) . However, he opposed the drive for theory construction, which he saw as the impulse of metaphysics, and intended his philosophy as a form of conceptual clarification.
N Stirk
The connections between abstract philosophical ideas and contemporary social scientific studies of culture will be explored by examining human behaviour as a rulegoverned activity. This will involve a consideration of what foundations there can be to the rules that are followed by individual agents. In describing language use and action as forms of rule-following, Wittgenstein stated that there is, ultimately, an end to interpretation, and a foundation below which there is not conscious decision but only a preinterpretive, prelinguistic human response (Wittgenstein, 1969, §110 ; see also Thrift, 1996 , chapter 1). Where human action involves no signification, where there simply is no representation, it would be mistaken to apply the concepts and categories of literary theory. This is not to exclude such techniques entirely, rather to suggest that there are elements of culture which do not incorporate the same kinds of intellectualism and which are better grasped through theories of practice informed by Wittgensteinian philosophy.
First, some examples of theories of practice will be set out, with particular reference to Giddens and Bourdieu, both of whom have had a significant influence on geography and both of whom acknowledge an intellectual debt to Wittgenstein. Second, possible criticisms of the validity of the concept of practice will be addressed. Third, Wittgenstein's position will be sketched out, to show how his arguments dissolve the problems that are frequently seen to sabotage any attempt to describe distinct sets of practices as a boundable culture. This will lead to a more positive account of how investigations into language use and rule-following can contribute to a reorientation of theories of practice, although it will be contended that Wittgenstein depends upon a conception of human nature that is ultimately insecure. Last, a number of possible directions for geography will be presented, as well as some areas in which geographical research may clarify confusion in Wittgensteinian philosophy.
Theories of social practices: Anthony Giddens and Pierre Bourdieu
The study of social practices is an attempt to account for the different ways in which people act by referring not to conscious deliberation or rational choice, but to what are learned but unexamined modes of behaviour. It is suggested that a complex of such practices constitutes a way of life, akin to Vidalian genres de vie (Curry, 1989) . Within geographical work, attention has been paid to such practices where they are seen to be the common thread that binds individuals into a group, where a certain contingent definition of normality-the understanding that guides a practice-decides the outcome of a social situation. There are strong sociological overtones here, and clearly social and cultural geography have both been guided by developments in social theory.
Discussion of social practices have been shaped by developments in the philosophy of action in the last twenty years, especially in the work of Anthony Giddens, who has shown a sustained interest in Wittgenstein's philosophy. Particularly in the development of his theory of structuration, Giddens was keen to steer a path between voluntarism and determinism, and found valuable hints in Wittgenstein on ways to incorporate ideas about individual agency and the implication of language in definite social practices, which in turn play a major part in the ongoing reproduction of society (Giddens, 1979) . This is not to say that Giddens is or was a Wittgensteinian, nor to suggest that he completes the construction of a Wittgensteinian sociology. Wittgenstein's influence is far from dominant, and many of the criticisms of Giddens are not to be dissolved by referring back to Philosophical Investigations (although see the suggestions of Thrift, 1993) . However, the way in which Giddens draws on the ideas of Wittgenstein is perhaps the clearest example of linguistic philosophy being assimilated into social theory so as to face the problems of empirical research. Giddens makes particular use of Wittgenstein's ideas about rules not on the basis of a general analogy between language-games and social action, but from the initially surprising perspective of comparing social rules to the mathematical formulae treated by Wittgenstein (Giddens, 1984, page 20) . For both, understanding is not a mental process, but subsists in the very practical ability of applying the rule correctly. Most importantly, Giddcns highlights the fact that a soeial rule is like a mathematical formula in the sense of being a procedure that can be generalised. This is a necessary step for establishing that humans do not, and cannot, obey rules blindly and be assured that, once learnt, the rule will cover every eventuality That is a vain hope because no single rule can be drafted so as to encompass all future circumstances, and because social action uses many rules at once, generating contradictions and compromises which must simply be coped with. As Giddcns states, Wittgenstein's concept of rule-following designates practices which express the recursive character of social life (Giddcns, 1979, page 41) : there arc often unacknowledged conditions to be dealt with, and unintended consequences of the application of rules as a result. Repeated instances of this type of situation, where flexibility in the use of rules becomes necessary in order to cope with different scenarios, are therefore likely to show the intentional character of actions, as what Giddcns calls "a chronic feature of reflexive monitoring" (page 41).
A second key application of Wittgensteinian thinking to theories of social rules is introduced by the distinction between discursive consciousness and practical consciousness. Wittgenstein's emphasis on the similarities between social rules and the rules of games will mislead if we assume that all the rules we use can be written down in a similar fashion to the rules of chess or the laws of cricket. These games arc regulated by closely worded statements that are distinct from the actions taken in the game, their rules are specified exhaustively and they are often arbitrary: why six balls in each over? why eight pawns rather than nine or ten? (for a weak defence, see Wittgenstein, 1974, §192 : "The rules of a game arc arbitrary* means: the concept 'game' is not defined by the effect the game is supposed to have on us"). In each of these ways the analogy to society is inadequate (see Morawetz, 1978, pages 52-58) .
However, the mastery of techniques that is evident in the smooth engagement with rapid, complex social action often contrasts with the inability of practitioners to elaborate verbally the rules they employ in attuning their behaviour to circumstances. First, such questioning after the event is an artificial analytical separation of individual rules from a tangled mass of instincts, habits, and rules of thumb in use alongside discrete rules. Second, a great proportion of social practices involve rules that are never normally questioned, made explicit, or written down. This is apparent from the limits of teaching, and the near-universal acceptance of methods like ostensive definition and explanation by examples of a type. The rules in question operate at the level of practical consciousness, and as such the evidence of understanding them resides entirely in the demonstration of abilities. This can still allow for the regular application of such an unspoken rule in the same way on different occasions, and for a standard procedure to be understood and called upon to show how someone has deviated from what is a correct interpretation of the rule. Thus actors can exhibit a form of understanding that is fundamentally noncognitive, an understanding of the instrumentality of speech and action. In Wittgenstein's terminology, language-games are founded on certain ways of acting which are primitive or prelinguistic forms of behaviour not conditioned by prior beliefs (Phillips, 1977, page 84) . This amounts to a kind of comprehension of what actions are likely to achieve what outcomes in what circumstances. It is akin to the use of tools and how to wield them effectively that is based on the unsupported ground of a form of life, and that is not subject to open debate about correctness and agreement. If there is negotiation, in the nonverbal sense, between differing interpretations of how to follow a rule correctly in a certain practical situation, it is closer to negotiating an obstacle course than it is to negotiating a treaty.
N Stirk
Just as Giddens's use of Wittgensteinian ideas is instructive about their applicability to social science, so the work of Pierre Bourdieu sheds considerable light on the study of language, practices, and culture. In criticising the tendency to focus on the object of study as an object, rather than reflecting on the relationship between researcher and researched, Bourdieu notes that " 'culture' is sometimes described as a map; it is the analogy which occurs to an outsider who has to find his way around in a foreign landscape and who compensates for his lack of practical mastery, the prerogative of the native, by the use of a model of all possible routes" (Bourdieu, 1977, page 2) .
There are several similarities between Bourdieu and Wittgenstein (on the influence of the latter, see Bourdieu, 1990, page 9) . First, both try to escape the opposition of subjectivism and objectivism by undercutting it. Just as Wittgenstein argued for the necessity of locating meaning in a social context, so Bourdieu asserts that we can identify the objective structures of society, but that we must analyse at the same time the conditions under which that objectivation occurs; that is, the perceptual and evaluative schemata with which social action is understood as meaningful, and through which the objects of knowledge are constructed (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, pages 12, 121) . Second, for both Wittgenstein and Bourdieu, linguistic competence is inseparable from a nexus of practical abilities. Third, and developing this point, the two authors try to categorise cultural difference on the basis of distinct modes of speech and action; Wittgenstein by reference to 'forms of life', and Bourdieu with his concept of 'habitus'. The latter is a durable set of dispositions that are structured (by socialisation and particular historical relations) and structuring (in guiding, but not determining, an individual's actions) (Bourdieu, 1977, page 72; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, page 126) . It is habitus that is held to generate practices, and examples of a 'scientific habitus' or an 'economic habitus' avoid limiting individuals to the membership of only one cultural group, by suggesting the coexistence of multiple dispositions and understandings. People can show a range of competencies, deploying different practical skills in the course of everyday life as different social situations are encountered, thereby moving between forms of life and the structures of meaning unique to each of them. A fourth similarity pertains to an emphasis on corporeality: where Wittgenstein emphasised the natural history of the human species and the commonality of certain human reactions (see Wittgenstein, 1969, §475) , Bourdieu connects habitus to bodily 'hexis' (borrowing a term from Marcel Mauss), to show that language is connected not just to interaction with other people as other language users, but also to the physical condition of the human form: "Language is a technique of the body " (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, page 149, emphasis in original) . A fifth point of contact emerges in the general view that what seems fundamental and what is taken for granted must be scrutinised and questioned. However, it is here that important differences can be seen, as the methods proposed for analysing habitus or forms of life are quite different.
Bourdieu says little about how we are to analyse habitus, other than referring obliquely to its social and historical construction (Bourdieu, 1991, pages 37-39) , and even his efforts to objectivise the objectivating relation remain within the notion that what language does is represent. In contrast, Wittgenstein provides a clear method for describing forms of life-by examining the ways in which language is used-which allows that there are limits to representation. This has two implications for geography: first, that if cultures are described in terms of practices and forms of life, then it should be possible to describe and map them by identifying unexamined assumptions and the rules guiding social action; and, second, that some of the epistemological problems associated with participant observation will need to be reconsidered according to such a conception of cultural difference (more will be said about this later).
Theories of social practices make a challenge to individualist social ontologies by arguing for the irreclucibly collective nature of many human actions. Just as Giddcns's structuration theory sought to refute methodological individualism without granting social structures autonomy from the actions of individual people within social groups, so Theodore Sehat/kt, in his avowedly Wittgcnstcinian approach, identifies social practices as the fundamental component of social life (Schatzki, 1996, page 12 ). Yet some have held that practices are a fiction with no real existence, and that a social theory based on them will be entirely insecure. In the following section, one of the more elaborate attacks on the concept of practice will be considered, in order to show how Wittgenstein's contributions not only evade such criticisms but undercut them. From that point it will be possible to evaluate the worth of the ideas of Schatzki, Giddcns, and others.
Turner's criticisms of theories of practice In his detailed recent attempt to examine critically the limitations of such accounts of behaviour, Stephen Turner concentrates on practice as a much-used building block in the grander edifices of social theory (Tlirner, 1994a) . He surveys the work of a number of authors, including Heidegger, Durkhcim, Mauss, the French school of Amwlustes, and Foucault, as it relates to presuppositions in behaviour and the sociology of culture. All of these authors, particularly Heidegger and Foucault, have influenced geographical writing (see Philo, 1992; Schatzki, 1991) , but the subtle shifts in interpretations of practice are not always apparent in oblique references to background and local contingency. Turner performs an invaluable service in demanding a more critical conception of human understanding, although his analysis begins to look suspect in the light of Wittgenstein's antimetaphysics.
Although he recognises that the idea of practice has taken on diverse forms, Turner argues that all of them share certain core ideas about the background to social action: about what it is, how it is communicated, and how it informs human activities. The concept of practice, or the more relativistic term 'practices', is used in many ways as the terminus of explanation rather than as something to be explained, so much so that " [t]ruth, validity and [interpretive] correctness are held to be practice-relative rather than practice-justifying notions" (Turner, 1994a , page 9, emphasis in original). He poses a series of germane questions about the elusiveness of the concept of practice, which are worth setting out here, particularly as he does not attempt merely mild revisions, but arrives at a highly sceptical position about the merit of using the term at all, and concludes that the notion of practice itself is too flawed to be of any use.
Turner's questions fall into four main categories: practices as causes, practices as presuppositions, the transmission of practices, and changes in practices over time. He argues that practice must either be an object with causal power or a descriptive term grouping parts of social activity which share some common feature, and that "[e]very causal account which attempts to establish sameness leads to ludicrous results" (Turner, 1994a, page 13) . Turner pursues the problem of defining two (or more) things as 'the same' for this purpose to a question of epistemology, and ultimately concludes that it is impossible to arrive at a watertight definition in order to show that a practice is entirely shared. In the absence of such a definition, Turner sees fit to condemn the concept of practice as epistemically elusive, as referring to something that is not directly accessible to an observer, and as requiring that we make inferences that cannot distinguish causal explanations from analogies.
Turner refers to Wittgenstein's philosophy of language only to typify a mistaken view of practices. His treatment is instructive insofar as it exemplifies an attitude towards the concept of practice which demands that it deliver a set of transparent N Stirk and self-sufficient rules. But that such a demand is an unreasonable and impractical one should be made clear. Turner's expectation is that we should be able to transcribe the recipe that is being followed and specify exactly the codes of conduct on show. For that to be possible, practices would need to be structured on the lines of the mythical perfect language, that ideal notation of symbols whose meaning is both transparent and modular, whose exact prescriptions can be verbalised or referred to for easy guidance when in doubt, a language which itself exists in a realm beyond doubt and corrigibility. In essence, Turner is digging for the ground on which human practice is based, rather than accepting that practice is itself the most basic foundation. The main thrust of nonfoundationalism is that practices can exist unsupported, as no more than the crystallisation of unreflective human actions. There is therefore an end to explanation not in deterministic accounts but in descriptions of the context in which those actions occur: not mediated by representations, interpretations, or cognitive processes, but as a form of direct encounter with the world. By enquiring about the transmission of practices and their development and change, Turner tries to isolate the elements of practices that are inter subjective, and that are involved in reproducing cultural forms and in perpetuating the structures of a form of life. Wittgenstein's private language argument (Wittgenstein, 1953, §243-315) shows the constraints on any individual's efforts to decide the meaning of a word or phrase. The meaningfulness of words is seen to hang on the possibility of their being effective as instruments for communication, and on corrigibility within a social context. Turner is unconvinced by this reasoning, because of the need to ensure that different people understand the meaning of a word in exactly the same way, and because he refuses to accept agreement in practices as sufficient evidence of a meaning being the same for several people: he demands a still more basic level supporting agreement in practices. According to the private language argument, one person's understanding of a mathematical rule (or a linguistic rule, or a behavioural norm) is the same as another's if both use the rule in the same way, whether that means carrying out calculations by the same route (and reaching the same answers), being able to explain how they perform such a process, giving an appropriate answer to a question, or appreciating that a stimulus demands a response. On this basis, there simply is no more basic level, no foundation beneath the ground on which we stand (Wittgenstein, 1953, §253) .
This does not require that everyone with the 'same' understanding reacts in precisely the same way, as there can still be identical understandings evident in free, individual choices: clearly one person's response to a perceived physical threat may be to fight and another's may be to flee, but we can still accept that both may have had the same perception of likely violence, the risk of injury, the various consequences of a range of responses, and so on. What determines our knowledge of the perceptions being the same is the background circumstances defining rational or appropriate action, including the capabilities and dispositions of the individual facing the choice. Different people may perceive the same situation, but be hesitant, brave, or foolhardy, and they are likely to react differently because of their individual characteristics. This variability in judgement can be seen as subordinate to practices, yet be consonant with an agreement in the definition of the nature of the threat. It is only when a response appears to fall outside an expected range of reasonable behaviour that we need to invoke the idea of cultural difference in terms of a practice or tacit understanding that colours the perception of threat and changes the set of options available (to someone whose behaviour remains consistent with those norms). These practices cannot be expected to give a reference guide like a trigonometry table, that can give the single, indisputably correct answer. This is a vital issue for Wittgenstein's private language argument, and for any application of it in social science. Two quotations show the crux of Turner's argument; "the consistency of 'sameness* in the case of discipline is external Tacit conventions, rules, collective representations of practices and the like are* in contrast, the same infernally as well as in their external manifestations" (Turner, 1994a , page 58, emphasis in.original); and " [Wittgenstein] disposes of the problem of transmission by defining acquisition and agreement as identical, and treating agreement as a primitive concept, a brute fact" (Thrner, 1994a, page 75) . In the first we see the persistence of an inner/outer distinction, abjured by Wittgenstein, and in the second the mistake consequent on maintaining that dichotomy
By showing how following a rule must always have a public dimension, Wittgenstein moves beyond any limitation of understanding to the realm of individual mental capacity or a personal 'inner' world (Bloor, 1997, chapter 7; Wittgenstein, 1981, §490) . The only genuine test of an individual's understanding is his or her ability to put that understanding into practice. This is why Wittgenstein argues that those who can be said to be playing the same language-game will agree in judgements as well as in definitions: someone has acquired the correct use of a rule only when he or she is able to demonstrate agreement over the scope and effects of the use of that rule (Wittgenstein, 1953, §242) . For a research technique like participant observation, this argument suggests that cross-cultural understanding is possible insofar as an observer can grasp the rule by which a language-game is played, and that although participation may have a heuristic value, it is not a logically necessary part of gaining access to the codes of conduct which lend structure to a way of life.
What Turner appears to be searching for is some essential causal mechanism that can be examined to trace the communication of meanings, and thereby the communication of practices, from one person to another. From a Wittgenstcinian angle, this seems to be a problem of not accepting what we do already as a solid enough basis; in teaching a language, and explaining what certain words mean, wc do not have to explain to a child how ostensive definitions work, or where to look when we point at something. Certain common forms of explanation have been evolved that rely on typical human reactions, and the likeliest answer to persistent queries about why this is called 'white wine', or why North is the opposite direction to South, is to say "this is just what we do" In general, Turner seems to deny, or to ignore, Wittgenstein's attempt to limit the number of layers that can be examined: for Wittgenstein, what causal mechanisms do exist, for example in the brain processes of cognition or perception, do not form a foundation below that in which language is given meaning, and propping it up, but exist in an entirely different realm. The discovery that certain brain activities correspond to the meaningful linguistic activities of asking questions, or intending, or expecting, or believing, for example, would not greatly assist us in determining what it meant to ask a question, to intend, to expect, or to believe (see Hacker, 1990 , page 160).
Turner's own prospectus for social research is based on the idea that what have been called practices are really no more than habits; he espouses a form of relativism, in which local practices are no more than a function of certain facts being taken as presuppositions, and therefore held as the fixed points around which other understandings can develop (Turner, 1994b) . In that account, cultural difference arises only insofar as variations in local situations lead to the establishment of different facts as presuppositions. He leaves no space for a shared human nature, and the only kind of final grounding appears in the shape of a fairly minimal pragmatism about finding the most useful presuppositions with which to go on in the world. Having listed some epistemological barriers to the identification of mental states as shared, he seems reluctant to infer the existence of mental entities at all, and moves very close to a form of behaviourism (see Acourt, 1995) .
Turner expresses his doubts about the depiction of shared practices in the following way: " [t] here is nothing about the 'tests' to which a person's acquisition of rules are put in ordinary social interaction or speech that assures that the 'same' rules are being followed" (Turner, 1994a, page 75) . Is someone's acting appropriately a good guarantee of their sharing a practice and understanding a situation in the same way as someone else? Certainly there is a possibility of a chance action coinciding with the behaviour expected of a knowledgeable actor, but after repeated trials, the credibility of an individual's claim to sharing understanding will be greatly increased. Wittgenstein's view is that without further information, we should accept this demonstration of competent linguistic practice as conclusive evidence of an ability to speak English. Instances of faltering, indications of external control, or an inability to adapt language use to changing contexts would provoke doubts, and in each case would also suggest ways of investigating the speaker's faculties. Equally, this is not a sly way of introducing verificationism, as a rule and what accords with it are related internally (rather than predetermining the empirical evidence of what agreeing with the rule will mean).
Having criticised Turner's reading of Wittgenstein, a more positive outline can now be given of ways in which these apparently trivial quibbles, about what counts as the same and how practices are shared, allow us to think differently about culture and cultural difference. Turner's concern for the issue of sameness and difference should have special resonance for social and cultural geographers, as it has broader ramifications even if his own critique of contemporary theories of practice is misguided. That two people have the ability to follow a set of rules in the same way is a necessary condition for classing them in the same culture; there must be a certain level of similarity in their behaviours (or at least in the social skills they have, defined in this way) for an observer to see that they have the kind of shared understanding deemed to be characteristic of such a culture. Conversely, clear cultural difference is seen to exist where there is evidence of distinctly different forms of comprehension.
Wittgenstein on rule-following
Martin Heidegger once suggested that "philosophy in the age of completed metaphysics is anthropology" (Heidegger, 1973, page 99; see Rorty, 1982 , page 51). Wittgenstein's later philosophy has been described as a kind of "philosophical anthropology" (Kitching, 1988, page 254) , although Wittgenstein intended to show that metaphysics could not be completed, to show that it was a bankrupt and meaningless endeavour. The reading of Wittgenstein as an anthropologist derives from his interest in language, his connections from language to culture and to the delineation of what it is to be human, and the procedure he adopts of studying ordinary language and normal human interaction on their own terms, rather than positing the greater depths that metaphysics supposes.
The problem of deciding whether someone is following a rule, rather than coincidentally acting in the same way under certain conditions, is intrinsic to the debates on when we are to judge that someone understands the meaning of parts of language and is a member of a culture. According to Wittgenstein's philosophy of language, we will be satisfied that someone knows what a 'bergschrund' is, what 'havering' is, or what it means to 'sit on the fence', when we see that they can use the words appropriately in different circumstances, and can explain roughly what the terms mean in relation to other pieces of language (Wittgenstein, 1953, §157, 199) . The issue of rules enters the scene as soon as we suspect that there is a decisive difference between understanding a meaning and simply exclaiming "bergschrund!" in a mountainous region.
Understanding and following a rule both take place against a background of the mastery of a range of skills and abilities (Wittgenstein, 1969, §140-144) . Such competencies, whether in measuring, calculating, counting, or other modes of judging, are not manifest in thought processes or obscure mental events, but are shown in actions taken, by (toing certain things (Wittgenstein, 1953, §199-202) . If wc understand a rule wo must be able to act in accord with it, and following a rule is the practice of acting in accord with the rule. There are four main facets to this (see Baker and Hacker, 1985, chapter 4) . First, that there must be regularity in behaviour; that is, using the rule in the same way, This demands thai there be something identifiable (to observers as well as to participants) as a standard procedure, something that is also seen by the actors themselves to be the right pattern of things, as evidence of intention at work, rather than just the force of habit. Second, the distinction between theory and action is crucial. It is evident from Wittgenstein's discussion of private languages that it is incoherent to claim to have a private rule that governs one's behaviour but is somehow incomprehensible to anyone else (Wittgenstein, 1953, §243-315) . Robinson Crusoe's rules for running an island-state must be shareable even if they have not been shared hitherto. Understanding words is an ability that makes itself known in patterns of activity. Third, to follow a rule, there must be criteria of correctness: without some way of separating actions that accord with a rule from those that break it, there is no right or wrong, and no technique to be grasped. Fourth, Wittgenstein insists on adding the caveat that there is objectivity in the criteria of correctness, that the benchmarks of human behaviour do not consist simply of what is customary. That would reduce rulefollowing to doing what most people do, and leave little room for revision of what it meant to follow a certain rule or a paradigm shift that overturned the previous consensus.
Wittgenstein's reservation here is fundamental to his position on practices. He takes the view that founding rule-following in human agreement is mistaken insofar as it denies the autonomy of grammar. Accord with a rule is a normative concept, such that the line between what counts as agreeing with it rather than disagreeing is drawn by the rule itself (Wittgenstein, 1953, §238) ; that is, there is an internal relation between the rule and the criteria for following it correctly. It is a misunderstanding of the grammar of rules and rule-following to posit what would have to be an external relation between a rule of language and the majority decision of humans on what the rule meant and what would count as obeying the rule. Doing the same thing is quite distinct from doing the right thing. This is a highly provocative point. Wittgenstein seems to be arguing that the sounds made in speech and the marks on a page, uttered and written by people for their own use, are ultimately independent of us in deciding how they are to be used. This looks like a precarious stance, and most readers will require further details of this argument, in the shape of an explanation of how a practice can itself yield objective standards for determining what is correct. One interpretation could be that rules, as instruments used in everyday human life, entail certain criteria of correctness by virtue of the way the world works. Hence the way in which we follow the rule 'add one 5 will be streamlined to the correct shape by the repeated practices of counting put to work in monetary exchange, keeping the score in football, and so on. Were we to err, the disjunction between reality and the account we were keeping of it would soon become obvious, and we could check our calculations. Even if everybody followed a rule in an identical, identically wrong way, the possibility would remain that the gap could be identified, and then closed. Yet this is not Wittgenstein's position, and despite its apparent convenience, we can still imagine situations in which we could find a use for rules applied in such a way (by manufacturing interpretations under which reality and the rule could be said to agree), and he would not accept this position as valid. He does state, very clearly, that the ongoing stability of the world around us, in terms of the persistence of the laws of nature, is a precondition for the application of concepts N Stirk (see, for example, Wittgenstein, 1969, §209) . In the extraordinary instance of the world being radically different in some way, with a weaker gravitational force or the colours of trees and flowers changing continuously and unpredictably, then some of our concepts would be made redundant-the rule that violets are blue, for example, would no longer apply. It would not be wrong, as it was developed for different background conditions, but would now be irrelevant. Furthermore, Wittgenstein relies upon humans having a shared biological nature, and it is held to be the foundation for there being a common form of representation-we all see approximately the same parts of the spectrum, and the meaning of normal colour concepts is reliant on such perceptual faculties. But this aspect of embodiment is not sufficient as a justification for our forms of representation. Even the edicts that to imagine a language is to imagine a form of life, and that we must agree both in definitions and in judgements (Wittgenstein, 1953, §242) do not fully reconcile Wittgenstein to a realist version of necessity. In the end, Wittgenstein is concerned with rules, techniques, and practices as a phenomenon of human culture more than as an outcome of our material and physiological predicament. Stereoscopic vision, relatively limited hearing and sense of smell, and all the rest of our perceptual equipment, have a role as the basis for the way our conceptual tools are shaped, but do not cause us to follow rules in one way rather than another, nor do they explain (even in conjunction with an ontology of the material environment of human life) why we follow some rules. There is a level of description below which there is no foundation. Just as we do not have to explain to a child how the act of pointing works in giving an ostensive definition, so there are manifold other aspects unique to natural human behaviour that are unprompted, aspects in which there is already agreement so basic that it is axiomatic for us.
Wittgenstein asserts that a rule cannot be obeyed only once (1953, §199) . By definition, a rule must be followed on several occasions and thus become customary: repetition makes rule-following into a practice, a form of behaviour that is normal and in which actors are open to correction by their peers. It would be wrong to look at isolated instances, as understanding invariably occurs in the wider context of whole languages and the forms of life in which they are immersed. In relation to what accords with a rule, "going on thus is not correct because it is natural for us, in our culture. Rather, it is because we find it natural that we make it correct (and if we did not find it natural we would not have fixed it as 'correct')" (Baker and Hacker, 1985, page 237, emphasis in original) . Any rule that is codified, by being written down or verbalised, can be interpreted in various different ways, and that rule can be construed so that actions either break the rule or are in accord with it; yet in most cases there is agreement about what a rule means, and what is correct seems to be present without any interpretation at all (see Wittgenstein, 1953, §201) . Once made correct in this way, what accords with a rule is laid down as essential to the rule, internally related to it, and as part of the grammar of that rule. In this sense, grammar has autonomy, and the criteria of correctness in following a rule are objective, in a manner quite different from the forces of social construction that make a representation seem objective.
Wittgenstein's position is quite uncompromising. He suggests that the rules of grammar are arbitrary in a way that leaves little possibility of responsiveness to the practical costs and benefits of playing by those rules. He draws a contrast with the rules of cooking, which are not arbitrary as cooking is defined by its end: speaking is not defined by its end, and the rules of grammar which are followed in speaking can be called arbitrary. In the first instance, deviation from the rules (ignoring a recipe, perhaps) leads to cooking badly, but is still recognisable as cooking, whereas in the second, we would be speaking of something else entirely, playing another language-game (Wittgenstein, 1981, §320) . This does help to clarify the extremity of Wittgenstein's position* and is one of the reasons why he has occasionally been read as a philosophical idealist, but it does little to dissuade us from trying to find a language-game that seems better adjusted to the world as we experience it. His fall-back position is that there are practices which are not justified, and are finally unjustifiable, but which persist because they are natural to us as humans. This will seem unsatisfactory if we are sceptical about the kind of human nature proposed by Wittgenstein, in which case we will want to see the rules of speech as much closer to the rules of cooking: not wholly arbitrary, but with an end in sight, and subject to revision if we are unhappy with the results of our attempts at communication. Indeed, Wittgenstein's general remarks about the purpose of philosophy often seem to urge us in this direction, towards active analysis of different uses of language in order to rationalise them for greater clarity. Also, the evidence from the forms of life that surround us is that most of the language-games that take place are absolutely saturated with intentionality, success and failure, trial and error, and that they are played to fulfil human needs and desires.
The arguments here from Wittgenstein's major work, Philosophical Investigations, have been presented in a greatly compressed form. They are highly complex, and have consequences which ramify in many different directions. I have been able to give no more than an indication of the intricacy and sophistication of the thinking evident in Wittgenstein's writing. Philosophically there is a range of issues that I have not even touched upon, and I must signal that my interest in Wittgenstein effects a cannibalisation of spare parts from a smoothly running engine, so that to dismantle his work and to carry it so far from its original context does damage to the original. As a consequence of Wittgenstein's understanding of the role of philosophy and the methods appropriate to it, there arc empirical issues which were philosophically uninteresting to him and which do not help to clarify the concepts he was contending with. For instance, scientific discoveries cannot affect the grammar of our present concepts, and they cannot show a grammar to be true or false. Even when scientific findings are truly revelatory, we do not rejig previously satisfactory concepts but require the introduction of entirely new ones, and in that case the new concepts would be attended by their own grammar. Nevertheless, these issues have frequently troubled social scientific research. Indeed, it is often precisely the boundary between internal relations and empirical contingencies that has interested social theorists, but this is a line beyond which Wittgenstein does not step. In his work he tries to measure the limits to conceptual clarification, and suggests what is likely to occur should material conditions change in such a way as to devalue our present conceptual framework, but he does not present anything like a well developed methodology for studying social change. Nor are there simple lessons for geographers from such a philosophy of language: it is more a provocation to reconsider established epistemologies and assumptions about representation and cultural difference.
The uses of Wittgenstein's philosophy in cultural geography
Wittgenstein's philosophy provides a way of conceiving human agency as the active ingredient in the production and reproduction of social structures and institutions, but it finally returns our view of correctness to what is natural for us, what is natural as human beings. His conception of human nature is a limited one, made questionable even by normal sexual difference: men and women, on Wittgenstein's account, have fundamentally identical natures, have the same understanding of embodied experience, and suffer barriers to communication only on the basis of gender, not because of their sex (Genova, 1995, page 187) . For Wittgenstein, conditions such as blindness or deafness seem to be little more than exceptions that prove the rule, rather than highly suggestive instances that challenge our assumptions about what is normal and throw light on more N Stirk common ways of seeing and understanding (Bouveresse, 1995, page 122) . Even before recent attempts in geography to make connections to psychological theory and psychoanalysis, there were efforts to draw on the evidence of the perception of people suffering aphasia, schizophrenia, or psychoses to elucidate more general notions of perception and spatial awareness (for example, Lowenthal, 1961 ).
Wittgenstein's presence has already registered in rational choice theory, in ethnomethodology, and in the work of Habermas on communicative action (on these lines of influence see Bohman, 1991, chapter 2) , as well as in Shotter's social constructionism (although he emphasises psychological structures and plays down the nonarbitrary character of grammar's autonomy: see Shotter, 1993 ). Yet despite the enormous stimulation to be found in Wittgenstein's writing on rules, his work as a whole remains largely detached from the everyday concerns of the social sciences. At the same moment as he says too much about the universality of a shared human nature, he is silent about the drifts and deceptive undertows of power in all its manifestations. Where Giddens argues that rules should not be considered in isolation from the resources on which actors are (unequally) able to call, Wittgenstein is mute, treating forms of life as given. For him conventions are not arbitrary but an effect of the characteristics of a species, with the result that "they do not appear as 'negotiated', as themselves the product of human action, but rather as the backdrop against which such action becomes intelligible" (Giddens, 1993, page 57) . Human nature, and therefore the correctness of rule-following that it entails, is taken to be irreducible.
Having described the rules involved in a certain practice, nothing more can be said simply because there are no more elemental constituents, and nothing more to say. A study of grammar, in the manner conducted by Wittgenstein, is targeted at the internal relations between rules and what accords with them, involving work at a level that is entirely preliminary to research into external relations and empirical social forms. Yet we need to understand not only accord with a rule, but compliance, acceptance under duress, and the presence of apathy, coercion, or fear in decisionmaking. There are inevitably power relations at work in the structuring of practices, deciding who chooses what game to play, who adjudicates, and sometimes predetermining who will win.
For all Wittgenstein's emphasis on avoiding obfuscation, on giving precedence to well-established, fully functioning ordinary language, and on recognising the ground that lies before us as ground, he has an undisclosed ontology concerning human nature and its exhibition in behaviour. Despite that, the project of linguistic philosophy provides an invaluable introduction to some of the fundamental problems-of defining rules and what it is to follow a rule correctly, of detecting agreement and what counts as the same-which must be addressed if theories of practice are to be effective tools for the study of human behaviour.
It is because we can imagine different practices that we are led to question the assumptions Wittgenstein makes about the universality of forms of behaviour; the fact that most people follow rules in the same way, and that exceptions interrupt an absolutely primary expectation of how other humans see the worlds, takes us towards an understanding of what it is to be human. Anthropology has a long history of exploring the boundaries between nature and culture, and it is instructive to see how few patterns of behaviour are truly ubiquitous, and how general the categories of incest taboos, giftgiving, and food rituals are. The kind of behaviours considered by Wittgenstein's philosophy are more minute and everyday, but the principle is the same: there are surprisingly few features of social practice common to all human groups. This is a lesson for the study of ordinary language as much as it is a caution to overenthusiastic sociologies of 'the body' and to mechanistic cognitive science.
At a time when the validity of the concepts of culture and practice face sustained criticism, a Wittgensteinian philosophy of language can help the practice of geography in several ways. First, it leads to a reconsideration of the fundamental issue of what is human in human geography. Insofar as human society is characterised hy rule-following activity in practices, with all the implications outlined above, there are distinctions to be drawn between humans and animals and between humans and machines (pace Haraway, 1991) . The way in which these classifications are made possible also impinges on questions of personal and collective identity. The strands of Wittgenstein's philosophy considered here can contribute by ensuring that any analysis of discourse, studying the sparks Hying between words and ideas, is brought right down to earth. Languagegames are seen to be densely material and richly visceral involvements that are typical of the social animals that humans are (Wittgenstein, 1969, §475 ). Yet Wittgenstein's account of rule-following does little to distinguish the solid geology of human nature from the sedimented layers of socialisation that rely on it (and also disguise it); the dividing line between inescapable human nature and the contingencies of culture must be considered if theories of practice are to be properly situated with regard to the limitations on intentional rule-following (see also Hagberg, 1995, chapters I and 8) . This proves crucial to human geography in general because it takes us directly to the central issue of what is specifically human in behaviour.
Second, a focus on rule-following and social practice enables a detailed consideration of human embodiment in relation to the concept of place. What is largely implicit in Wittgenstein's work can be drawn out by concentrating on the ways in which territoriality and social rules are constitutive of each other (Sack, 1993) , with neither taking precedence either logically or temporally. Having argued that there exist multiple cultures, and that actors can move between forms of life, the question of how a culture can be bounded or mapped is made problematic. A number of principles can be stated here: some practices require a demarcated space or involve the control of behaviour within a defined area (for example religious festivals or a theatrical performance); there are often visual cues that facilitate correct practice, either in the form of signposts or physical markings, or in the actions and nonverbal responses of other people; elements of the built environment are designed to fulfil certain functions, to make certain forms of movement, sociation, or privacy possible, and to prevent or deter other activities (for example the use of surveillance cameras in city centres, the physical structure of transport networks, or the interior layout of offices and civic buildings); for various reasons some communities may cluster in or dominate an area, imposing a set of practices as the norm (for instance on the 'turf of a gang or in an artists' quarter); and in the course of repeating practices, space can be used in such a way that a sense of place is developed, often involving visible marks or the appropriation of certain buildings.
Third, and linked to this, is the possibility that seemingly intractable epistemological questions can be approached from a previously unexplored direction. Wittgenstein defines the criteria for understanding in terms of the possession of certain abilities and practical forms of knowledge. We can identify differences between human cultures, and their characteristic value systems, by attending to what different individuals do. It is far from impossible to move between forms of life: on a daily basis we each participate, with various degrees of competence, in many discrete practices, switching between language-games in the process. Different cultures are not just different sets of representations, but are different sets of practices which are place related (see also Bloor, 1997, page 95) .
The means of studying cultural difference are simple for Wittgenstein: we are to look at the ways in which language is used. This differs in a number of ways from N Stirk standard techniques of discourse analysis, and from structuralist linguistics, in that ordinary language is taken to be effective as it stands, and to be legitimate in its own right, requiring no uncovering of hidden depths. Because Wittgenstein's account of language does not posit a structure of representation, he avoids privileging a viewpoint which distinguishes appearance from reality. To study the everyday use of an aspect of language is to examine a language-game; that is, to consider the activities surrounding speech or writing, and to grasp the significance of the background conditions that are taken for granted, that together make up a form of life. There is a risk that Wittgenstein's philosophy will overstate language at the expense of considering emotional responses and wordless contacts. In this regard we must also remember the nonlinguistic forms used in artistic expression (music, painting, sculpture) which are expressive and can communicate meaning, but operate at the limits of language and are far removed from simple representation (Hagberg, 1995, chapter 3; Thrift, 1997) .
Furthermore, not only is it possible to investigate the ways in which certain vocabularies are put to work within a language-game, it is equally feasible to analyse the use of the word 'culture' itself. This is a particularly valuable exercise both in the course of unravelling the separate strands of interest within cultural geography and in distinguishing cultures from practices: Although these two are closely related, the fact that the word 'culture' is used quite differently should alert us to the fact that it is a term which has become implicated in distinct kinds of essentialism and reification. Culture, then, is not just something to be studied but an element by which sense is made of the world. Thus language shows constitutive power as well as a capacity for reflection: the acts of describing a culture, and of describing something as a culture, contribute to the understanding of human social life. A reading of Wittgenstein can therefore alert us to the linguistic context within which the categories of research are deployed, and to some of the closures which result from their particular grammar: thus philosophies of language of this kind point not so much towards the reconstruction of theory as to the comprehension of theories and the uses to which they are put.
Although the examples given here refer mainly to rule-following and sets of practices at a very local level, and indicate a conception of cultures as existing at a microscale, this is not a complete picture. There is much to be said for retaining notions of national cultures and for recognising that many practices are either international or are simply not bounded to a single location. The abstraction of a 'culture', either by academics or by practitioners themselves, therefore involves selecting certain practices which seem to hang together. In the working definitions cited earlier, the scale of the abstraction is no more than implicit; culture is rarely defined as having a minimum size, either of membership or of spatial extent. Also, because practices are sustained primarily by individual agents, even where there are institutional frameworks supporting or encouraging certain behaviours, it is consistent with what has been said for cultures to overlap and interact with each other, in the course of normal social contact and as individuals move from one set of rules to another.
As one set of practices is grouped as a culture, that act of naming-as an 'enterprise culture', a 'heritage culture', and so on-serves to formulate the rules that are to be followed, and to normalise certain practices as part of an existing culture, as if the independent life of a culture entailed a corresponding loss of free will in its members. In portraying related practices as collectively comprising a culture, there is the risk of treating those practices as some kind of building blocks; this would imply too much modularity, as if practices were fixed and independent of each other. A practice is just as much an abstraction as a culture, a category of behaviour that is isolated on the basis of certain ideas about human nature and causality. Equally, to talk about particular cultures, or local practices, is not in itself any less of an essentialisni than to generalise about 'society*.
There is a very human geography to social practices. The notion of practices as suggested here concentrates on behaviour for which reasons can be given, which can be challenged by others, and which is bound into wider forms of life, Thus questions of meaning and understanding, practical and discursive consciousness, can all be brought into sight by attention to the specific geography of families of practices. By restricting the definition of practices to rule-governed action, we can see more clearly how the contingent differences of cultures with specific histories and geographies arc suspended within a web of essentially human nature. Whether or not we accept Wittgenstein's interpretation of the form of human nature that frames the sharing of practices, we must at least confront his arguments if we are to grasp the complexities of individual difference and their unravelling in shared forms of life. An appropriate response from geographers would be one which demonstrated the relevance of cultural difference and the importance of place to the definition of human nature, and which thereby presented a direct challenge to one of the foundations of Wittgcnstcinian philosophy.
